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Present: The Honorable MICHAEL W. FITZGERALD, U.S. District Judge  
 
 Deputy Clerk: Court Reporter: 
 Rita Sanchez Not Reported                     
 
 Attorneys Present for Plaintiff:  Attorneys Present for Defendant: 
 None Present None Present 
 
Proceedings (In Chambers):  ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 
DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. PROC. 12(b)(6) 
AND 12(b)(1) AND MOTION TO STRIKE 
NEWLY-ADDED CLAIMS PURSUANT TO 
FED. R. CIV. PROC. 12(f) [27] 
 
Before the Court is Defendants Gerald A. Longarzo, Jr.’s and Jeff Civillico’s 
Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) 
and 12(b)(1) and Motion to Strike Newly-Added Claims Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 
12(f) (the “Motion”), filed on March 13, 2018.  (Docket No. 27).  On March 22, 2018, 
Plaintiff ISE Entertainment Corporation (“ISE”) filed an Opposition.  (Docket No. 29).  
On April 2, 2018, Defendants filed a Reply.  (Docket No. 32).  The Court held a 
hearing on April 16, 2018. 
For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is DENIED (again) as to ISE’s 
DMCA section 512(f) claim.  The Court has already denied Defendants’ original 
motion to dismiss ISE’s DMCA claim.  Defendants’ attempt to re-argue the issue now 
is in contravention of Rule 12(g)(2), and the Court rejects Defendants’ attempt to frame 
their DMCA argument as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.  Moreover, even if the 
Court were inclined to consider Defendants’ current DMCA arguments, Mr. 
Longarzo’s August 2017 email correspondence with Amazon that Defendants now 
seek to introduce does not deprive ISE of the right to obtain discovery in relation to its 
DMCA claim.   
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The Motion is GRANTED with leave to amend as to ISE’s breach of contract 
and rescission and restitution claims.  As the Court understands the allegations in the 
FAC, the Deal Memo was the contract that was purportedly breached in various ways 
by Civillico.  The Court does not see how the Deal Memo can be interpreted to impose 
the obligations that were allegedly breached. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. ISE’s Original Complaint and the Court’s February 2 Order 
On November 22, 2017, ISE filed a Complaint against Defendants in the Los 
Angeles County Superior Court.  (Complaint, Docket No. 1-1).  ISE alleged the 
following in its Complaint: 
ISE, a Nevada corporation with its principal place of business in Las Vegas, is 
“the owner, creator and copyright holder of the television series, ‘The Weekend in 
Vegas,’ (the ‘Program’) which airs on the ABC Affiliate station in Las Vegas, Nevada, 
and was, until the actions of Defendants herein, available for download on 
Amazon.com.”  (Id. ¶¶ 1, 7). 
Civillico, a Nevada resident, is the co-producer of the Program and appears on 
camera as the Program’s host.  (Id. ¶¶ 3, 9).  On February 2, 2017, ISE and Civillico 
entered into a written “Deal Memo,” a one-page document that ISE attached to its 
Complaint.  (Id. ¶ 8, Ex. 1).  The Deal Memo provides, inter alia: 
Company [ISE] and Co-Producer [Civillico] have established 
a business relationship through the production of the 
television series known as The Weekend in Vegas…   
… 
Co-Producer agrees that any work created during the course 
of business with Company is the original work and property 
of Company.  Co-Producer further agrees that all rights, 
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including copyrights, performance rights and publicity rights, 
belong to Company. 
(Id. ¶ 8, Ex. 1).   
 On August 18, 2017, Amazon Video Direct (“Amazon Video”) sent an email to 
“info@arttecusa.com” (apparently an email address associated with ISE), indicating 
that Amazon Video had received a complaint from Longarzo, a California resident and 
Civillico’s attorney, concerning ISE’s posting of Program episodes on the Amazon 
Video website.  (Id. ¶¶ 2, 10-11, Exhs. 4, 6).  Amazon Video’s email said, in pertinent 
part: 
We’ve received a notice from a third party [Longarzo] 
claiming that the distribution of the following title [the 
Program] and/or its audio/video contents you submitted for 
sale through Amazon may not be properly authorized by the 
appropriate rights holder…  As a result, we’ve suspended 
distribution of this title, pending further investigation.  Below 
is the contact information for the third party who claims you 
infringed its rights [listing Longarzo’s name and email 
address].  We expect that you’ll compensate this party for any 
infringing copies sold. 
(Id. Ex. 4).   
 ISE claimed that Amazon Video’s removal of the Program from its website was 
prompted by a notification of infringement that Longarzo submitted to Amazon Video 
pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), 17 U.S.C. § 512, which 
ISE refers to as a “DMCA Notice.”  (Complaint ¶¶ 10-11).  ISE claimed that the 
“DMCA Notice is false and was false at the time it was filed,” because Longarzo 
falsely “represented in the DMCA Notice, under penalty of perjury, that the Program 
infringed upon the copyright of … Civillico.”  (Id. ¶ 12).   
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 On August 24, 2017, an attorney for ISE wrote a letter to Longarzo, contending 
that, pursuant to the Deal Memo, Civillico “holds no rights to any intellectual property 
of ISE regarding [the Program],” and demanding that Longarzo “immediately notify 
Amazon that your client’s [Civillico’s] claim is withdrawn.”  (Id. ¶ 13, Ex. 5).  On 
August 29, 2017, Longarzo responded by email, contending that ISE was in breach of a 
verbal agreement to pay Civillico $1,000 per week and that the Deal Memo does not 
permit ISE to use Civillico’s “name, image or likeness in connection with [his] on-
camera services” absent authorization, and refusing to withdraw the Amazon Video 
claim.  (Id. ¶ 14, Ex. 6). 
 On November 13, 2017, ISE’s current counsel sent a letter to Longarzo (which 
was not attached to the Complaint), allegedly informing Longarzo that, “in the DMCA 
Notice, Longarzo knowingly misrepresented to Amazon.com that the Program was 
infringing, and demanded retraction or withdrawal of the DMCA Notice.”  (Id. ¶ 15).  
Longarzo responded by email the next day, writing, inter alia, that “[t]he information 
in your letter is not accurate, but we thank you and Gary [principal of ISE] for your 
continued interest in Jeff [Civillico].”  (Id. ¶ 15, Ex. 7). 
 In its Complaint, ISE asserted four claims for relief: (1) a claim for declaratory 
relief seeking “a judicial declaration of the rights and duties of the parties hereto with 
regard to who is the rightful owner of the copyright of the Program,” against both 
Defendants; (2) “damages for false DMCA Notice” pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 512(f), 
against both Defendants; (3) breach of contract, against Civillico; and (4) fraud, against 
both Defendants. 
 On December 20, 2017, Defendants removed the case from Superior Court.  (See 
Notice of Removal, Docket No. 1).  Defendants invoked this Court’s federal-question 
jurisdiction with respect to ISE’s claim for damages under the DMCA.  On December 
27, 2017, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss ISE’s original Complaint pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6) and (somewhat curiously, since they had just removed the action to this 
Court) Rule 12(b)(1).  (Docket No. 8). 
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 In an order dated February 2, 2018 (the “February 2 Order”) (Docket No. 17), 
the Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to ISE’s DMCA section 
512(f) claim, and granted the motion with leave to amend as to ISE’s breach of 
contract, fraud, and declaratory relief claims. 
 In denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to ISE’s DMCA claim, the Court 
rejected Defendants’ argument that ISE lacked standing to bring its DMCA claim 
because it had not obtained a copyright registration covering the Program from the U.S. 
Copyright Office.  The Court also rejected Defendants’ arguments that ISE had not 
adequately alleged that Longarzo’s communications with Amazon Video constituted a 
takedown notice under the DMCA (i.e., a request that complied with 17 U.S.C. § 
512(c)(3)), and that ISE failed to allege that Defendants acted with the requisite mental 
state (i.e., a “knowing[ ] material[ ] misrepresent[ation]”) to trigger section 512(f) 
liability.  (See Feb. 2 Order at 7-12). 
 In granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to ISE’s breach of contract claim, 
the Court agreed with Defendants that the breach of contract claim was preempted by 
the Copyright Act insofar as the subject matter of the claim (the Program) fell within 
the subject matter of the Copyright Act and the rights asserted in connection with the 
breach of contract claim (e.g., to publicly display and distribute the Program) were 
rights protected under the Copyright Act.  (See id. at 12-16). 
 B. The First Amended Complaint  
 On February 26, 2018, ISE filed the operative First Amended Complaint, in 
which it asserts three claims for relief: (1) “damages for false DMCA Notice” pursuant 
to 17 U.S.C. § 512(f), against both Defendants; (2) breach of contract, against 
Civillico; and (3) “rescission and restitution,” against Civillico.  (FAC (Docket No. 20) 
¶¶ 1-30). 
 The allegations relating to ISE’s DMCA claim (which are most of the factual 
allegations) in the First Amended Complaint are identical to those in the Complaint.  
(Compare FAC ¶¶ 1-19 with Complaint ¶¶ 1-15, 19-23). 
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 As discussed further below, ISE has revamped its breach of contract claim to 
focus on Civillico’s actions or inactions as co-producer of the Program instead of on, 
for example, Civillico’s “using clips from the Program on his website without 
authorization…”  (Complaint ¶ 27; see FAC ¶¶ 20-24).      
II. PLEADING STANDARD 
In ruling on the Motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court follows Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and their Ninth 
Circuit progeny.  “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when the complaint either 
(1) lacks a cognizable legal theory or (2) fails to allege sufficient facts to support a 
cognizable legal theory.”  Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013).  
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . 
to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).  The Court must disregard allegations that are legal 
conclusions, even when disguised as facts.  See id. at 681 (“It is the conclusory nature 
of respondent’s allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that 
disentitles them to the presumption of truth.”); Eclectic Properties E., LLC v. Marcus 
& Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2014).  “Although ‘a well-pleaded 
complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof is improbable,’ 
plaintiffs must include sufficient ‘factual enhancement’ to cross ‘the line between 
possibility and plausibility.’”  Eclectic Properties, 751 F.3d at 995 (quoting Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 556–57) (internal citations omitted). 
The Court must then determine whether, based on the allegations that remain and 
all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, the complaint alleges a 
plausible claim for relief.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. 
Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2011).  “Determining whether a 
complaint states a plausible claim for relief is ‘a context-specific task that requires the 
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’”  Ebner v. 
Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 963 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).  Where 
the facts as pleaded in the complaint indicate that there are two alternative 
explanations, only one of which would result in liability, “plaintiffs cannot offer 
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allegations that are merely consistent with their favored explanation but are also 
consistent with the alternative explanation. Something more is needed, such as facts 
tending to exclude the possibility that the alternative explanation is true, in order to 
render plaintiffs’ allegations plausible.”  Eclectic Properties, 751 F.3d at 996–97; see 
also Somers, 729 F.3d at 960. 
III. DISCUSSION  
 A. DMCA Claim 
 The DMCA-related allegations in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint are 
identical to the DMCA-related allegations in Plaintiff’s original Complaint.  The Court 
rejected Defendants’ DMCA-related arguments in its February 2 Order.  Nonetheless, 
Defendants again move to dismiss the DMCA claim.  This time – rather than targeting 
the allegations in the First Amended Complaint themselves – Defendants argue that 
Longarzo’s communications with Amazon did not in fact constitute a DMCA 
takedown notice because he did not specifically reference copyright infringement in 
those communications, and submit along with their Motion a declaration from 
Longarzo with an August 2017 email chain between Longarzo and two Amazon 
employees attached.  (See Declaration of Gerald Longarzo, Jr. (Docket No. 27-1), Ex. 
A). 
 As an initial matter, the Court rejects Defendants’ slightly tweaked re-argument 
regarding ISE’s (identical) DMCA claim as inconsistent with Rule 12(g)(2), which 
provides that, except with respect to motions challenging subject matter jurisdiction 
(among other things that are not relevant here), “a party that makes a motion under 
[Rule 12] must not make another motion under [Rule 12] raising a defense or objection 
that was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(g)(2).  Defendants have obviously been in possession of Longarzo’s email 
correspondence since the commencement of this action, yet declined to raise their 
“incorporat[ion] by reference” (Reply at 4) argument in their first motion to dismiss.   
 Courts commonly invoke Rule 12(g)(2) to reject new arguments raised in a 
motion to dismiss an amended complaint that could have been raised in a previous 
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motion to dismiss a prior complaint but were not. See, e.g., Chancellor v. OneWest 
Bank, No. C 12-01068 LB, 2012 WL 3834951, at *3 n. 4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2012) 
(rejecting a second motion to dismiss a claim for breach of a mortgage-modification 
plan); Falcon v. City University of New York, 15-cv-3421 (ADS)(ARL), 2016 WL 
3920223, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2016) (denying a motion to dismiss Title VII 
claims in a proposed SAC containing “nearly identical” allegations in a FAC that was 
never challenged on that basis);  5D C. Wright & A. Miller Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 1385, Application of Rule 12(g) – In General (3d ed. 2017) (Rule 12(g) 
“generally precludes” a Rule 12 objection that could have been raised but was not).  
Similarly, this Court declines to endorse Defendants’ piecemeal motion practice and 
declines to consider Longarzo’s email correspondence (which easily could have been 
provided with Defendants’ initial motion papers) in connection with the present 
Motion.  
 The Court also rejects Defendants’ spurious attempt to present their DMCA-
related argument as a challenge to the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.  Defendants’ 
challenge is directed at the sufficiency of the DMCA claim, not subject matter 
jurisdiction.  The crux of Defendants’ subject matter jurisdiction argument is that ISE 
“has not – and cannot – allege any claim under the DMCA, as no DMCA takedown 
notice was ever sent,” and that “[a]s a consequence, federal question jurisdiction is 
lacking under Rule 12(b)(1).”  (Mot. at 9).  In their Reply, Defendants bizarrely suggest 
for the first time that – seemingly as a result of the Longarzo-Amazon email 
correspondence – ISE may lack constitutional standing to pursue its DMCA claim.  
(See Reply at 3-4).   
 Defendants are mistaken.  Whether or not Longarzo’s relevant communications 
with Amazon might be construed as a DMCA takedown notice goes to the viability of 
ISE’s DMCA claim, not to the Court’s federal-question jurisdiction over that claim or 
the issue of whether ISE has alleged a concrete and particular harm sufficient to endow 
it with standing to pursue that claim.  For the very reasons that this Court has 
previously articulated, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a DMCA claim.  Whether that 
claim has merit or not will be determined through summary judgment or trial. 
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 Finally, even if the Court were inclined to consider Longarzo’s August 2017 
email correspondence with Amazon in connection with the present Motion, that email 
correspondence does not – prior to any discovery being had – operate to invalidate 
ISE’s DMCA claim at the pleading stage.  ISE has alleged, upon “inform[ation] and 
belie[f]…, that Defendant LONGARZO represented in the DMCA Notice, under 
penalty of perjury, that the Program infringed upon the copyright of Defendant 
CIVILLICO,” that Amazon notified ISE that it was removing the Program from 
Amazon Video due to a “third party who claims you infringed its rights.”  (FAC ¶¶ 10, 
12, Ex. 4).  While it may be unlikely that ISE will be able to ultimately establish that 
Longarzo communicated with Amazon in a manner that could trigger DMCA section 
512(f) liability (assuming the emails Defendants provided with their present Motion 
would not, which the Court does not now decide), it must be given the opportunity to 
conduct some discovery on the issue in light of its viable DMCA claim. 
 Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED with respect to ISE’s DMCA 
section 512(f) claim. 
 B. Breach of Contract Claim 
 In connection with its breach of contract claim, ISE alleges that Civillico 
received consideration for his services under the Deal Memo (a 5% equity stake in ISE) 
and that ISE satisfied all of its obligations under the Deal Memo.  (See FAC ¶¶ 21-22, 
Ex. 1).  ISE alleges that, on “August 18, 2017, and thereafter,” Civillico breached the 
Deal Memo by: 
a. Failing to contribute time and talent to fulfill his duties 
 as co-producer on  production of [the Program], 
 including serving as the on-camera host of the 
 show, scheduling, scriptwriting and logistical services 
 ordinarily performed as a co-producer of a television 
 show; 
b. Failing to contribute time, talent and resources to fulfill 
 his duties as co-producer, by business contacts, 
Case 2:17-cv-09132-MWF-JC   Document 38   Filed 04/16/18   Page 9 of 13   Page ID #:337
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 




Case No.  CV 17-9132-MWF (JCx)  Date:  April 16, 2018 
Title:   ISE Entertainment Corporation v. Gerald A. Longarzo, Jr., et al. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                  CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL                                               10 
 
 venues, celebrity guests, shooting locations,  office and 
 greenroom space, cross-promotion and marketing 
 during his Comedy in Action stage show; 
c. Withdrawing the following talent and resources he had 
 contributed to the television series as co-producer: 
 i. Instructing KNTV Las Vega to stop airing the 
  television series; 
 ii. Cancelling the Caeser’s Entertainment shooting 
  location and venue for the television series; 
 iii. Cancelling the greenroom facilities at the Ling 
  Hotel; 
 iv. Cancelling Plaintiff’s executives’ Caesars  
  Diamond Cards; 
 v.  Cancelling celebrity guest bookings; 
 vi. Withdrawing the production staff of Jeff  
  Civillico, Inc.; 
 vii. Cancelling cross-promotion of the television 
  series in his Comedy in Action show; and  
 viii. Cancelling an arrangement with Amazon TV to 
  distribute the television series. 
d. Failing to contribute resources as co-producer, by: 
 i. Failing to provide monetary contributions; and  
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 ii. Cancelling sponsor contributions from  
  Vegas.com, Dignity Health, LiveNation,  
  LV.Net, and Caesars Entertainment. 
(FAC ¶ 23). 
 Despite the fact that ISE has entirely shifted its breach of contract claim from 
alleging that Civillico breached the Deal Memo by interfering with ISE’s alleged rights 
to display and distribute the Program to alleging that Civillico breached the Deal Memo 
by failing to do his job, Defendants again argue that the breach of contract claim is 
preempted by the Copyright Act.  The Court disagrees. 
 As discussed in the February 2 Order, state law claims are preempted by the 
Copyright Act if two questions are answered in the affirmative: (1) Does “the ‘subject 
matter’ of the state law claim fall[ ] within the subject matter of copyright as described 
by 17 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103[?]”; and (2) “[A]ssuming that it does, … [are] the rights 
asserted under state law … equivalent to the rights contained in 17 U.S.C. § 106, which 
articulates the exclusive rights of copyright holders[?]”  Laws v. Sony Music 
Entertainment, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations 
omitted).   
 ISE’s current breach of contract claim has almost nothing to do with rights 
protected by the Copyright Act – i.e., the rights to, inter alia, reproduce, distribute, 
publicly perform, and publicly display that work.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106.  It has to do 
with the manner in which Civillico performed or did not perform his role as co-
producer of the Program.  Thus, the Court does not agree that the current breach of 
contract claim is preempted by the Copyright Act. 
 However, none of the newly alleged breaches are actually tied to any provisions 
of the one-page Deal Memo.  The only things that the Deal Memo explicitly required 
Civillico to do were to “keep all [information he learned during the course of his 
relationship with ISE] … confidential and secure from all third parties, unless he 
obtain[ed] written consent to do otherwise,” and to “agree[] that any work created 
during the course of business with [ISE] is the original work and property of [ISE].”  
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Nothing in the Deal Memo, for example, required Civillico to “contribute time and 
talent” to ISE or to supply ISE/the Program with any specific quantity of “business 
contacts, venues, celebrity guests, shooting locations, office and greenroom space, [or] 
cross-promotion and marketing” resources for any specific duration of time.   
 Simply put, if ISE intended to bind Civillico to do any of the things it now 
alleges he was bound to do, it should have entered a contract with him that actually said 
these things.  The Deal Memo essentially does not require Civillico to do anything 
apart from keeping ISE’s information confidential. 
 Based upon both the Complaint and the First Amended Complaint, it appears 
that the only “Agreement” upon which ISE asserts its breach of contract claim is the 
Deal Memo.  (See Complaint ¶¶ 8, 24-28, Ex. 1; FAC ¶¶ 8, 20-24, Ex. 1).  Because the 
Deal Memo does not require Civillico to do any of the things that ISE now alleges it 
required him to do, the actions or inactions ISE now complains of do not constitute 
breaches of the Deal Memo. 
 As the Court discussed at the hearing, it is possible that (a) there is some sort of 
contract apart from or in addition to the Deal Memo; or (b) based on the mutual 
understanding of the parties and extrinsic evidence, the Deal Memo might be 
interpreted to impose the alleged obligations.  That depends, in part, on Nevada or 
California contract law (apparently the choice of law is disputed).  While the Court has 
doubts about ISE’s breach of contract claim given its shifting nature, the Court will 
allow ISE one more opportunity to amend this claim.  If ISE is unable – consistent with 
Rule 11 – to plausibly allege a contract as described, then the Court discourages actual 
amendment. 
 Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED with leave to amend as to the breach of 




Case 2:17-cv-09132-MWF-JC   Document 38   Filed 04/16/18   Page 12 of 13   Page ID #:340
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 




Case No.  CV 17-9132-MWF (JCx)  Date:  April 16, 2018 
Title:   ISE Entertainment Corporation v. Gerald A. Longarzo, Jr., et al. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                  CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL                                               13 
 
 C. Rescission/Restitution Claim 
 As ISE acknowledges, rescission/restitution “is not a cause of action, but a 
remedy for breach of contract.”  (Opp. at 14).  Because ISE has not stated a viable 
breach of contract claim, it has also not stated a viable rescission/restitution claim.  In 
light of the fact that the Court is giving (without necessarily encouraging) ISE one 
more opportunity to amend its breach of contract claim, it will allow ISE one more 
opportunity to assert its right to rescission and/or restitution. 
 Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED with leave to amend as to the 
rescission/restitution claim. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Motion is DENIED as to ISE’s DMCA 
section 512(f) claim, and it is GRANTED with leave to amend as to ISE’s breach of 
contract and rescission/restitution claims. 
ISE shall file a Second Amended Complaint, if any, by May 7, 2018. 
In the event ISE elects to file a Second Amended Complaint, Defendants are 
cautioned not to seek dismissal of the DMCA claim.  While there may be a Second 
Amended Complaint, there will be no Third.  Any future successful motion to dismiss 
the contract claims will be granted without leave to amend. 
In the event that ISE does not file a Second Amended Complaint by May 7, 
2018, Defendants shall answer the First Amended Complaint by May 21, 2018. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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